Figure 1: A Map of Iran’s Major Ethnic Groups and Tribes. Retrieved from: The Iran Primer https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/sep/03/iran-minorities-2-ethnic-diversity
Global Conflict & Crisis Strategic Solutions (GC2S2)
Our Mission: To contribute meaningfully in conflict zones and during times of crisis.
About us: GC2S2 is an action-based think tank in Tysons, Virginia, USA, focusing on the Middle East and Africa. We concentrate on long-term strategic solutions to conflicts and crises in 3 ways: research and analysis to identify issues in countries we operate in, providing humanitarian aid through emergency & crisis services, distributing supplies locals need, and capacity building by establishing long-term sustainable solutions.
We are an apolitical organization and do not intervene or involve ourselves with any political entities or organizations.
Purpose: The weekly report aims to bring awareness to critical issues throughout the Middle East and Africa while identifying ways to address these concerns. We use these reports to identify future projects and strategic solutions for the problems raised. The weekly report is meant to be clear, concise, and inform readers while simultaneously providing unbiased perspectives and insights by addressing every issue pragmatically and holistically.
Projects: Currently, GC2S2 is developing two main projects focused on Syria and Lebanon. The Syria aid basket project is designed to provide 3,100 refugees with a monthly supply of essential food and hygiene kits. The Lebanon project is designed around digital literacy and English courses to alleviate rural Lebanon’s lack of educational access.
Key Statistics
The Iranian Population is 87.92 million people.
The total population is 61% Persians, 16% Azerbaijanis, or Azeris, 10% Kurds, 6% Lur, 2% Baluchis, 2% Ahwazi Arabs, 2% Turkmen, and 1% other.
Iran is the most ethnically diverse country in the Middle East and Central Asia with 46 total ethnic and tribal groups residing in country.
Since 1918 the nation’s ethnic minorities have politically and militarily pushed for social reform, regime change, and secession.
On April 1st, 1979, the current authoritarian theocratic regime was established following the Islamic Revolution.
From 1979-2023 the Iranian government has been confronted by six substantial periods of dissidence fueled purely by socio-political grievances.
Starting on September 16th, 2022 the current regime has faced the largest and most destabilizing period of turmoil since the Islamic Revolution, driven by ethnic minorities.
In the first three months of the civil unrest more than 500 protestors have been killed and more than 19,000 have been arrested.
Overview
The current regime considers internal security matters to be the greatest threat to the nation. Former Minister of Intelligence, Ali Yunesi, identified that the greatest domestic threat is ethnic minorities. In accordance with these beliefs, the government has consistently oppressed the nation’s ethnic minorities and suppressed any information pertaining to them.
Why Ethnic Minorities Matter
Due to their geographical locations, ethnic minorities present both major geopolitical and economic threats to the government. Secessionist and semi-autonomous movements have often been triggered by transnational and tribal sentiments from neighboring states and territories like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kurdistan, and Balochistan.
Figure 2: A Map Highlighting The Transnational Semi-Autonomous States of Balochistan and Kurdistan. Retrieved From Go Iran Tours https://goirantours.com/map-of-iran/
Many of these ethnic minorities inhabit resource-rich and heavily industrialized provinces. The Ahwazi Arab-inhabited Khuzestan province, seen in Figures 1 and 3, holds 78% of the nation’s oil reserves, the majority of its natural gas reserves, and is the leading manufacturer and exporter of steel. The province is also the nation’s agricultural breadbasket, leading production in wheat, corn, rice, sugar beet, and sugarcane. The Sistan and Baluchistan province hosts major trade routes to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, features the nation’s sole oceanic port at Chabahar, and contains millions of tons of untapped rare-earth mineral reserves. Ethnic minorities also inhabit the other main provinces that grant critical military and maritime access to the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea.
If the ethnic minorities were to succeed in seceding or seeking semi-autonomy, the nation would not only be drastically reduced in geographical size but would also see significant reductions in access to trade infrastructure and critical resources. The loss of Khuzestan alone would be economically catastrophic.
Questioning The Demographics
Aside from their geographical locations, the sheer population-size of the ethnic minorities also poses a direct threat to the government. This may explain why the government has not publicly released up-to-date demographic reports since its establishment in 1979. From 2000-2010, the CIA’s World Factbook posited that Persians comprised only 51% of the total population, with Azeris being the largest ethnic minority accounting for 24%. However, in 2011, the CIA inexplicably increased the Persian population to 61% and decreased the Azeris to 16%. One possible explanation for this drastic change is that Azeris are the only ethnic minority to frequently intermarry with Persians. The government considers intermarried couples to form households that are wholly Persian. It is also widely believed that the government actively underreports the population of Ahwazi Arabs due to the economic importance of the provinces they inhabit, particularly Khuzestan. This tactic is likely implemented to dissuade international actors from supporting anti-regime and pro-secessionist grassroots movements amongst these minorities.
Systemic Ethnic Oppression
The government has aggressively repressed the unique identities of ethnic minorities, seeking to create a nationally unified Persian identity. Many community leaders have been assassinated, executed, and unjustly imprisoned. Despite comprising only 10% of the total population, ethnic Kurds account for more than 70% of all judicial executions. Kurds and other predominantly Sunni ethnic minorities are also frequently labeled as members of Sunni terrorist networks like the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. The government’s practice of branding individuals as terrorists ensures national alienation, “justifies” military retaliation, and attempts to create a positive perception of their military actions. In September of 2022, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) murdered more than 80 Baluchis departing from Friday prayer in Sistan and Baluchistan’s provincial capital of Zahedan. According to the regime, many of the victims allegedly had ties to various terrorist networks. Similar mass-murder operations by the IRGC were reported throughout other ethnic minority-dominant provinces. The regime frequently uses civil upheaval as justification to target and systemically kill ethnic minorities.
Figure 3: A Provincial Map of Iran Highlighting How Most Protestors Killed By Government Forces In The 2022 Upheaval Resided In Ethnic Minority-Dominant Provinces. Retrieved From: WikiMedia (Data Collected from Iran Human Rights) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2022_Iran_Protests_%28Killed%29.svg
Speaking non-Persian languages is illegal and is considered a national security threat by the government. The Ministry of Education mandates that ethnic minority students participate in courses that promote the idea that their “authentic” ethnic identities are Persian. Additionally, the government forces minorities to choose from a list of pre-approved Persian and Islamic names, barring millions from embracing their cultural heritage.
The government also actively prevents ethnic minorities from attaining socioeconomic positions of power by frequently taking ownership of farms, factories, and other lucrative businesses. Government officials and their families often legally appropriate these businesses for personal gain. Well-qualified ethnic minorities are selectively excluded from managerial positions in favor of Persians frequently imported from other provinces.
Ethnic Minority Responses
The government’s on-going oppression of ethnic minorities has caused the formation of many anti-regime and pro-secessionist organizations. The Southern Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement is a purely political organization advocating for increased cultural rights, a secular federal government, and potential secession. The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Free Life Party, and Komala operate both politically and militarily for increased autonomy and cultural rights, while the Kurdistan Freedom Party seeks a fully-independent Kurdistan. The Baloch Nationalist Movement politically advocates for a fully autonomous transnational Balochistan, while prominent Baluchi organizations like Harakat Ansar Iran and the Army of Justice do so militarily. Ahwazi Arab organizations like the Hawks of Ahwaz and the Mohiuddin Nasser Martyrs Brigade regularly target Khuzestan province’s critical infrastructure attempting to establish an independent Arab state. Other ethnic minorities like the Lur, Turkmen, Gilaks, and Mazanis have notably fewer active organizations and primarily focus on politically attaining increased cultural rights and pro-democratic socio-political reforms.
Solutions
Due to the authoritarian and unstable nature of the current regime, GC2S2 is unable to provide the nation’s marginalized ethnic minorities direct assistance. However, by implementing awareness campaigns about the challenges faced by these communities, GC2S2 can help shed light on human rights abuses, discrimination, and cultural suppression. Through strategic dissemination of information, education, and advocacy, GC2S2 can mobilize support, generate solidarity, and apply pressure on appropriate international actors to address the plights of Iran’s ethnic minorities. Amplifying their voices and highlighting their struggles can contribute to a broader movement for change and create a platform for dialogue, understanding, and ultimately, equality and justice.
Bibliography
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Nada, Garrett. “Iran’s Troubled Provinces: Khuzestan.” The Iran Primer, 3 Feb. 2021, https://iranprimer.usip.org/index.php/blog/2020/jul/29/iran%e2%80%99s-challenges-converge-khuzestan.
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Shaffer, Brenda. Iran Is More than Persia – Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Apr. 2021, https://www.fdd.org//srv/htdocs/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/fdd-monograph-iran-is-more-than-persia.pdf.U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iran/.