A Map Of What Is Considered To Be Kurdistan. Retrieved From: https://www.istockphoto.com/vector/kurdistan-kurdish-lands-political-map-gm579766618-99722949

Global Conflict & Crisis Strategic Solutions (GC2S2)

Our Mission: To contribute meaningfully in conflict zones and during times of crisis.

About us: GC2S2 is an action-based think tank in Tysons, Virginia, USA, focusing on the Middle East and Africa. We concentrate on long-term strategic solutions to conflicts and crises in 3 ways: research and analysis to identify issues in countries we operate in, provide humanitarian aid through emergency & crisis services distributing supplies locals need, and capacity building by establishing long-term sustainable solutions.

We are an apolitical organization and do not intervene or involve ourselves with any political entities or organizations.

Purpose: The purpose of the weekly report is to bring awareness to critical issues throughout the Middle East and Africa while also identifying ways in which we can address these concerns. We use these reports to identify future projects and strategic solutions for the problems raised. The weekly report is meant to be clear, concise, and inform readers while simultaneously providing unbiased perspectives and insights by addressing every issue pragmatically and holistically.

Projects: Currently, GC2S2 is developing two main projects focused on Syria and Lebanon. The Syria aid basket project is designed to provide 3,100 refugees a monthly supply of essential food and hygiene kits. The Lebanon project is designed around digital literacy and English courses to alleviate the lack of educational access in rural Lebanon.

Key Statistics

Total Global Kurdish Population: 42 million

Kurds are the largest minority group in the world that remains nation-less. 

“Kurdistan” consists of 35 million Kurds living in Eastern Turkey (17 mil.), Northern Syria (2.8 mil.), Northern Iraq (6.4 mil.), and Northwestern Iran (8.8 mil.).

More than 7 million Kurds constitute the Kurdish diaspora, living primarily in Germany (1.5 mil.), Lebanon (650,000), Azerbaijan (200,000), and France (150,000). 

One-fifth of Turkey’s population are estimated to be Kurdish. 

The Kurdish-Turkish conflict began in 1978 with the establishment of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

From 1984-2020, there have been more than 8,167 Turkish security personnel, 6,270 civilians, and 53,332 Kurdish casualties due to the Kurdish-Turkish Conflict.

Turkey has spent more than $500 billion since 1984 oppressing the Kurds and fighting their militant organizations.

Background

The Kurds have been a nationless people since 1920 when the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, rejected the Treaty of Sevres due to the proposed establishment of an independent Kurdish state. Ever since, the Kurds have been continuously oppressed by the Turkish government in an attempt to forcefully create a unified ethno-national identity.  

Between 1923-1991, the utilization of the Kurdish language, attire, cultural traditions, and personal names have been outlawed by Turkish political leaders. Many Kurdish businessmen, landowners, and politicians have been arrested, tortured, or deported and their former possessions have been redistributed to ethnic Turks. The government has even referred to them as “Mountain Turks” in demographic reports and other official documents to deny their existence entirely.

The revolutionary and pro-communist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was founded in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan in response to the Turkish government’s oppression campaign against ethnic Kurds. The organization was originally formed to establish increased linguistic, cultural, and political rights for the nation’s Kurdish population. However, in 1984, the PKK became a secessionist movement with the ultimate goal of establishing a unified and independent Kurdistan.

The U.S. State Department designated the PKK as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997 due to the organization’s affinity for targeting Turkey’s government and civilian infrastructure. The PKK has frequently attacked military bases, schools, hospitals, sporting venues, transportation hubs, shopping malls, and tourist sites. The organization has also been linked to summary executions and political assassinations of opposition, numerous civilian massacres, drug trafficking, and the use of child soldiers.

In 1998, Turkey increased military operations against the PKK forcing the organization to abandon its foothold in Eastern Turkey and re-establish itself in Iraqi Kurdistan. The PKK declared a formal end to hostilities with Turkey in 2000, denounced its former secessionist objective, and stated that it would implement more peaceful methods to obtain increased autonomy within Turkey. This announcement led to the creation of more hardline separatist offshoots such as the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) in Western Turkey and Northern Syria’s Democratic Union Party (PYD). 

The PYD developed its militant wing during the 2011 Arab Spring known as the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Their objective was to defend Kurdish lands from encroachment by the Assad regime and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Since 2015, the YPG has comprised more than half of the U.S. and NATO-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). However, the YPG simultaneously threatened Turkey’s regional interests, generating a perpetual complication between the U.S., NATO, and Turkey. The U.S. and NATO refuse to cease support of Kurdish forces against ISIS and the Assad regime, while the Turkish government refuses to accept the possibility of a semi-autonomous Syrian Kurdistan along its border.

The Current Situation

Though the nation’s Kurdish population has received some concessions from the government, they are still unable to publicly speak Kurdish or give their children Kurdish names. Additionally, the Turkish government continues to actively prevent Kurds from celebrating important holidays, including Kurdish New Years, or Newroz. Security forces frequently disrupt both public and private celebrations of traditionally Kurdish holidays and even arrest Kurds planning and participating in them.

The government has also passed “anti-terror laws” aimed at muzzling Kurdish journalists and media outlets. Those covering the government’s oppression campaign can be sentenced to three years in prison for “hate speech” and “spreading terrorist propaganda.” Their access to the internet and social media platforms have also been increasingly restricted by the government and its intelligence services. Publishers are also denying the publication of media in Kurdish to avoid government imposed fines and closures. The government has also imposed curfews in the Kurdish-dominant Eastern region of the nation, inhibiting millions from accessing basic services.

The Turkish government oppresses more than just ethnic Kurds. Security forces have repeatedly targeted and detained humanitarian aid workers and tourists for interacting with Kurdish culture. In some instances, these detainees have been tried and sentenced to prison by military tribunal or even tortured without being allowed to contact their respective embassies.

The Turkish military has also conducted several operations into Northern Iraq and Syria targeting PKK and YPG strongholds. Between 2016-2020, in a coordinated effort with the Syrian National Army (SNA), Turkish forces seized control of more than 1,000 villages and towns on the Turkish-Syrian border from the YPG. Turkish forces consistently prioritize targeting the YPG over ISIS, creating friction between themselves and the western world. Turkey’s ultimate objective is to establish a geographical buffer zone between itself and Kurdish-controlled territories.

A Map Highlighting Turkey’s Military Bases And Proposed Buffer Zone Across Northern Syria. Retrieved From: https://orientalreview.org/2019/08/10/a-safe-zone-for-syrian-refugees-so-near-yet-so-very-far/

In Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkish forces have frequently used artillery and drone strikes to target PKK infrastructure. The Turkish military has also established 14 permanent military bases hosting 7,500 troops along the Iraqi-Turkish border. The Turkish military presence is a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty, and has caused outrage amongst the Iraqi government and the international community. It is clear that Turkey is attempting to establish a second buffer zone between itself and Iraqi Kurdistan.   

A Map Highlighting Turkey’s Permanent Military Bases Across Northern Iraqi Kurdistan. Retrieved From: https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2022C37/

Prediction

While there has been a modest rise in the recognition of Kurdish culture from President Erdogan, these changes have been intended to pacify Kurdish separatist sentiment. President Erdogan has violated the nation’s constitution to secure a third consecutive term in 2023 and has rapidly increased his personal control over both the military and intelligence services, positioning himself for a lifetime of power. Erdogan will continue to use the nation’s security forces to maintain constant surveillance and control of the population. The nation’s ethnic Kurds will continue to be oppressed so long as Erdogan remains in power.

Turkish security forces are highly likely to continue to target PKK strongholds in Iraqi Kurdistan using drone and artillery strikes in the near future. Turkey’s establishment of a permanent military presence in Iraqi Kurdistan, despite gaining approval from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), has attracted unwanted international attention and condemnation due to the violation of Iraq’s national sovereignty. Increasing the presence of Turkish security forces in Iraqi Kurdistan and carrying out ground operations, which have been threatened by the Turkish government multiple times, would further violate Iraq’s sovereignty. Doing so could inadvertently mobilize KRG, Federal Iraqi, and international support for the PKK.

It is highly probable that Turkey will succeed in completing its buffer zone in Northern Syria within the next five years. Kurdish forces are on the brink of defeating ISIS in Syria, which will result in the subtle drawdown of U.S. and NATO support. Once ISIS is defeated, the Assad regime will likely resume operations against Kurdish forces to reclaim lost territory. Assad’s security forces and its Russian allies will be able to overpower the non-Western-backed Kurdish forces. However, while engaged with one another, neither the Kurds nor the Assad regime will likely have the resources to simultaneously combat increased Turkish military incursions into Northern Syria. Turkey will be unchallenged in completing its buffer zone across the entire Turkish-Syrian border.

Furthermore, Turkey will seemingly be presented with a unique and unavoidable dilemma in Syria once ISIS has been defeated. On the one hand, the Turkish government can serve its own interests, going against those of NATO, and support the Assad regime against the Kurds to ensure a Syrian Kurdistan is never established. On the other, Turkey can appease its NATO counterparts and ignore its own self-interests by supporting the Kurds in the future fight against the Assad regime and its Russian allies. The Turkish government’s decision in this foreseeable scenario hinges on President Erdogan’s assessment of Turkey’s NATO membership and global collaboration versus the significance of regional stability and diplomatic ties.

In 2022, Erdogan appeared to be positioning Turkey to leave NATO after effectively blocking Sweden from joining the organization and increasing the nation’s economic interdependence with Russia. However, as of July 11th, 2023, Erdogan and Turkey have seemingly reversed their previous stance, agreeing to allow Sweden to join NATO and working to sever increased economic ties with Russia. As a result of this recent policy reversal, it can be expected that Turkey will act according to NATO’s interests with regard to Syria in the future. Turkey will either collaborate with NATO forces to reluctantly support Kurdish forces against the Assad regime or will refuse to play an active role in the expected future conflict altogether.               

Bibliography

Child Soldiers in Isis, PKK, Boko Haram… – Hrwf.Eu, hrwf.eu//srv/htdocs/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Child-soldiers-in-ISIS-PKK-Boko-Haram%E2%80%A6.pdf.

Hummel, Kristina. “The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons: A Profile of the Arm’s-Length Proxy of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 16 Nov. 2017, ctc.westpoint.edu/the-kurdistan-freedom-falcons-a-profile-of-the-arms-length-proxy-of-the-kurdistan-workers-party/#:~:text=%5Ba%5D%20The%20TAK%20was%20designated,CNN%2C%20January%2011%2C%202008.

“Kurdish Repression in Turkey.” Cultural Survival, www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/kurdish-repression-turkey.

“Kurdish Repression in Turkey.” Cultural Survival, www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/kurdish-repression-turkey

“Kurds.” Minority Rights Group, 6 Feb. 2021, minorityrights.org/minorities/kurds-2/.

Mandiraci, Berkay. “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux.” Crisis Group, 18 Feb. 2022, www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/turkeys-pkk-conflict-regional-battleground-flux.

Palmer, Alexander. “Examining Extremism: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): Examining Extremism.” CSIS, www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-kurdistan-workers-party-pkk.

Iraq News Map in English – News from Baghdad, Anbar, Kirkuk, Nineveh, Kurdistan Regions – Iraq.Liveuamap.Com, iraq.liveuamap.com/en/2023/27-june-warplanes-belonging-to-turkish-air-force-command. 

“Timeline: The Kurds’ Quest for Independence.” Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/timeline/kurds-long-struggle-statelessness.

 “Turkey’s Erdogan: New Ground Offensive in Syria ‘When Convenient.’” Syria’s War News | Al Jazeera, 23 Nov. 2022, www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/23/turkeys-erdogan-new-ground-offensive-in-syria-when-convenient.

Van Wilgenburg, Waldimir. “Iraq: Eight Killed by Suspected Turkish Shelling on Popular Tourist Resort in Kurdistan.” Middle East Eye, www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraq-turkish-shelling-killed-popular-tourist-resort-kurdistan.

Washington Kurdish Institute. “Another Dark Year for Kurds in Turkey under the Current Leadership.” Washington Kurdish Institute, 23 Mar. 2023, dckurd.org/2023/03/23/dark-year-for-kurds-in-turkey/.